The Lightness of Underestimating the Fascist Rise

The phenomenon of fascist movements, and fascist leaders and fascist parties in power, is rapidly spreading across the world. In many of our articles, we draw attention to the objective ground that creates this, and the great danger the working class faces.Unfortunately, it cannot be said that all socialist factions equally recognize or even comprehend this threat. This oversight exacerbates the peril confronting the working class, as it weakens the ability to prepare and fight against this menace. Some socialists argue that certain movements within the far right do not openly pursue a fascist strategy but merely mimic fascist rhetoric to gather votes. For instance, they place the Reform UK Party in this category, citing its expulsion of self-proclaimed fascists as evidence, despite its attacks on Muslims and immigrants and its use of fascist discourse. Similar assessments are made about Marine Le Pen in France, interpreting her break from her father as distancing herself from fascism. According to these views, figures like Trump, Modi, and Bolsonaro also fall into this category—they are merely “right-wing demagogues”.

It is true that within the broad spectrum of the far-right, there are tendencies, parties, or leaders who cannot currently be labelled as fascist. However, when proponents of this argument claim that the primary goal of far-right parties is to gather votes, while supposedly clarifying a difference, they are actually blurring the distinction between the center-right and the far-right. Worse still, as a consequence of this claim, they assert that such imitative/fake fascist parties do not pose a real threat or that the danger they present is limited to paving the way for genuine fascists. This approach contains serious errors, which we will briefly examine.

As fascist rhetoric gains traction among backward masses, center-right parties increasingly adopt their demands, particularly on issues like immigration and security. These parties tend to constantly shift further to the right under the pressure of the fascist movement. They want to regain lost votes or stop the bleeding of votes by adopting the slogans and rhetoric of the far-right. But the proponents of the argument in question are not referring to center-rightists, but rather those within the far-rightwho are supposedly not fascist. However, drawing such clear distinctions within the far-right isoften untenable. Whether fascist or not, all far-right parties engage in deception, presenting themselves as respectable parliamentary entities while employing various tricks, lying incessantly, and denying organic ties to paramilitary groups. Given this, the effort to draw rigid distinctions is futile. Evaluating far-right actors based on their parliamentary rhetoric or symbolic gestures is politically unserious. Those who make this mistake soothe their consciences by downplaying the danger, convinced that fascists in power or aspiring to power are not truly fascist.

As we stated at the outset, not all elements within the broadly defined far-right can be labelled fascist. Today, not only the far right but even the most extreme fascist elements often operate within legal bourgeois politics, participating in elections to gain strength. However, those we specifically label as fascists do not focus solely on parliamentary struggle. They also prioritize organizing paramilitary groups for street terror and infiltrating state institutions, particularly the armed forces and intelligence agencies. The far-right spectrum encompasses countless hybrid formations and ideologies, ranging from the most reactionary factions of the center-right to outright fascists. Yet, as crisis deepens, the shift toward fascism becomes stronger.

Exaggerating the differences between openly fascist groups and others within the far-right serves no purpose. There should be no doubt about the fascist mentality of leaders like Trump, Modi, Orbán, or Bolsonaro; denying their pursuit of a fascist regime offers no benefit to revolutionary politics. In truth, fixating on pinpointing where each leader or movement stands within the far-right spectrum is not a meaningful endeavor. Many leaders or movements are not static; their positions are not final. Thus, exaggerating differences or drawing sharp distinctions based on rhetoric or symbolic actions is methodologically flawed.

We must remember that the world is undergoing a process of authoritarianisation driven by an historical system crisis. Accurately assessing how far a country’s political regime has progressed in this direction is crucial. The establishment and consolidation of a fascist regime —a totalitarian dictatorship at the far end of authoritarianisation— determine the tactics of working-class struggle. The tactics for a revolutionary upsurge and those for a period of severe defeat cannot be the same. Here, we must avoid two extremes: ignoring an ascending or entrenched fascism, and labelling every repressive regime as fascist. For example, while leaders like Trump, Modi, and Orbán undoubtedly espouse a fascist mentality, their regimes cannot yet be called fascist. The clearest examples are the end of Trump’s first term and Bolsonaro’s ousting: despite their manipulations, fraud, and repression, they lost elections, staged weak coup attempts, failed, and were removed from power.

Attempting to create rigid subcategories for far-right parties, leaders, or transitional exceptional regimes is incompatible with Marxism. This approach is largely imposed by academia. At its core lies the error of defining fascism as a razor-thin line based on classical German and Italian fascism. Many bourgeois academics even treat Nazism in Germany and fascism in Italy as distinct regimes.

In his time, Trotsky meticulously analyzed the fascist ascent in Germany, identifying intermediate stages. He acknowledged and corrected his mistakes in labelling certain moments. Ultimately, it became clear that in such situations, rigidly categorizing each government as a specific regime type is futile. These are unstable transitional phases best interpreted as part of a broader fascist escalation. However, those inclined toward schematic thinking ignored real processes, inventing idealized roadmaps instead. They produced templates like, “First pre-Bonapartism, then full Bonapartism, followed by fascism, which will eventually revert to Bonapartism”.[1]In reality, “finance capital can resort to various exceptional government forms depending on the severity of the social crisis. Transitions between these forms are possible”.[2] Treating one possibility as the only option or inevitability is plainly wrong.

The arguments we critiqued at the outset repeat this error. They claim that the danger posed by “non-fascist far-right imitators” lies in clearing the path for genuine fascists. In other words, the real threat comes not from them but from the fascists they enable. Perhaps this will happen in some countries —we cannot know! But presenting this possibility as a certainty, insisting these actors will never evolve and only pave the way for others, is utterly mistaken. The last 15 years in Turkey are a striking case study that proponents of this view should examine seriously. Under Erdoğan’s leadership, the AKP began as a center-right party claiming to pursue democratic reforms for EU membership. Around 2010, after a power struggle with its former allies, it underwent a dramatic transformation, turning authoritarian and then embarking on a fascist escalation. Ultimately, while in power, it executed a civil coup, reshaping the regime from above. A party that began as “centrist” and “Muslim/conservative democrat” ended up as civilian fascism under the same leader, Erdoğan.

If a movement not initially far-right can rapidly veer toward the extreme, asserting that far-right movements in the West will remain static —merely paving the way for “genuine” fascists— is indefensible. Today, when the “revolution or counter-revolution” dilemma has not yet crystallized, expecting Western fascist movements to reveal their true nature outright is naive. Even the Nazis long pretended to be anti-capitalist until they consolidated power! Thus, we must recognize that such movements are evolving (Erdoğan and his party’s post-2010 transformation is a stark example), understand that hybrid formations with varying tendencies can emerge, and not overlook their deceit —their manoeuvres to disguise themselves and gain respectability.

Today, in many countries, the political climate has not yet made fascism an inevitable choice for the bourgeoisie. Neither revolutionary threats have grown concrete enough, nor have the means to counter them been exhausted. Still, the bourgeoisie covertly supports such organizations, preparing for the future. Until the opportune moment arrives, fascists continue gathering strength through various tactics.

Finally, let us reiterate: In the struggle against fascism today, the primary danger lies not in labelling every far-right party or repressive regime as fascist but in fixating on secondary details and ignoring the fascist reality before our eyes (and the global fascist threat). In Turkey, we have endured the stark and painful consequences of this blindness for years. Despite escalating repression, some still cling to the lie that elections can change everything, to parliamentary illusions, or to absurd notions like agreeing on a democratic constitution. Let us state clearly once more: “The world today is not one where winds of democracy and peace are gaining strength, but one where winds of war and fascism grow stronger. In such a world, what democratization can be discussed without the pressure of a rising labour movement? (...) Let us not forget: Democratic rights and freedoms are won not through elections but through an anti-fascist, democratic people’s struggle led by the working class.”[3]